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1 Introduction
Uganda has gained widespread recognition as one
the most successful turnaround states in Africa. From
a situation of acute economic and political crisis in
the late 1980s it has achieved macroeconomic
stability and sustained economic growth, steady
reduction in poverty and improvement in many
indicators of human development (World Bank
2004). Peace and political stability have been
restored in many parts of the country. Against these
impressive achievements, life expectancy is below
the level for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, largely
because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the
proportion of subsistence farmers living in poverty
remains high. Uganda’s population in 2001 was 24.2
million, growing at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent.
This article examines the reasons for Uganda’s
successful turnaround through the lens of political
economy. Conventional wisdom attributes Uganda’s
success in economic reform to several critical factors:
strong political commitment, high government
capacity and the willingness to learn from
knowledge and experience outside the country
(Harvey and Robinson 1995; Hölmgren et al. 2001).
Each of these explanatory factors is subject to critical
scrutiny in order to assess their relative contribution
to Uganda’s turnaround since the late 1980s.
Uganda’s record in addressing the root causes of
conflict is examined against the backdrop of success in
the implementation of economic reform and poverty
reduction. Success in bringing political stability to much
of the country is qualified by violent insurgency in the
western and northern regions, and the repercussions
of military intervention in the civil war in neighbouring
Congo. While the conflict in the west has been largely
subdued, the war in the north continues unabated
with major implications for poverty and growth in the
region and adverse consequences for relations with
Uganda’s neighbours, threatening to undermine the
gains of sustained reform and political stability enjoyed
by the rest of the country.
Data on economic growth, human development,
and the degree to which violent conflict has ended
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Figure 1 Real economic growth rates in Uganda, 1985–2002
SourceWorld Bank, World Development Indicators CD-Rom.
provide the key point of reference for determining
the nature and extent of turnaround. The data on
economic growth in Figure 1 provide evidence of
sustained growth, averaging 6 per cent per annum in
the late 1980s and reaching a peak of nearly 11.5 per
cent in 1996.
Trends in the human development index for Uganda
show steady improvement over the past 15 years,
from 0.402 in 1985 to 0.489 in 2001, comparing
favourably with economically more advanced
countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe, which displayed
a declining trend over the same period (Table 1).
Uganda’s turnaround can be explained in significant
measure by a virtuous combination of capable
government technocrats with a strong political
mandate and sustained support from aid donors.
Political leadership in the form of President
Museveni was critical to the success of the reform
package and the engagement with the international
community. The institutional framework developed
by government policy-makers gave rise to a series of
carefully sequenced reforms that in turn paved the
way for economic stabilisation and subsequent
growth and poverty reduction. Aid donors responded
positively to the favourable policy environment,
offering significant and growing levels of financial aid
combined with technical assistance that was used to
considerable effect by the government. The ideas
and influence of aid donors contributed to policy
design and helped to ensure continued government
adherence to policy commitments through the use
of conditionality. Growing levels of ownership
helped to sustain the momentum of reforms and
create a receptive environment for increasing levels
of aid (Kasekende and Atingi-Ego 1999; Hölmgren et
al. 2001; Reinikka and Collier 2001). The significance
of foreign assistance is confirmed by high levels of
aid flows from the late 1980s, reaching one-quarter
of national income in 1992, and ranging from 10–15
per cent thereafter (Figure 2). Foreign aid continues
to account for a significant share of government
expenditure, equivalent to 52 per cent of the
government budget in 2004.
2 Political instability after Independence
Uganda’s turnaround in the past two decades has to
be viewed in the context of the economic decline
provoked by political stability and a gradual descent
into civil war in the 1980s. The main cause of political
instability was contestation for political power
among rival ethnic and religious groups following
Independence in 1962, principally between the
traditional Bantu landowning elites in the south and
west of the country and various Nilotic peoples in
the north and east. There were also differences of
language and religion. The traditionally dominant
Buganda and Ankole in the south were largely
Catholic, while Protestantism held sway in Northern
Uganda (Kasozi 1999).
Increasingly authoritarian civilian rule under President
Milton Obote gave way to military dictatorship under
Idi Amin in the 1970s. The Amin regime was deposed
through Tanzanian military intervention in 1979, and
fresh elections the following year returned Obote to
power for a second term following two short-lived
military governments. The elections were widely
viewed as fraudulent and provoked armed opposition
from various military groupings that coalesced into
the National Resistance Army led by Yoweri
Museveni, with strong representation from ethnic
groups in the south and west of the country. The
military insurgency provoked bloody reprisals on the
civilian population on the part of Obote’s troops in
the Buganda heartland. Obote was toppled from
power by a military coup in 1985 that installed a
short-lived government under General Tito Okello.
Failed talks with the insurgents led to intensified
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Table 1 Human development index for selected African countries, 1985–2001
1985 1990 1995 2001
Kenya 0.510 0.535 0.519 0.489
Uganda 0.402 0.403 0.412 0.489
Zimbabwe 0.626 0.614 0.567 0.496
SSA – – – 0.468
Source UNDP, Human Development Report 2003.
military struggle leading to a National Resistance
Movement (NRM) victory in January 1986.
While it had a strong base of support among ethnic
groups in southwest Uganda (especially the
Banyankole and Banyarwanda), the government was
initially broad-based in composition, drawing former
opponents and representatives of the mainstream
political parties and ethnic groups into the political
executive. The NRM government is based on the
Movement system of politics in which political parties
were tightly regulated and prohibited from contesting
elections until a referendum in favour of a multi-party
system in 2005. The original intention was that the
no-party system would be a transitional arrangement
to contain the ethnic and religious rivalries that had
been the principal cause of violent conflict in earlier
years. All members of parliament represented the
Movement and elections were contested on individual
merit. While the Movement system was not
conducive to political competition, many observers
concede that reasonable freedom of association and
expression was tolerated by the government, with
regular national and local elections, an active civil
society and relatively free media. More critical
observers claim that the Movement regime is
increasingly assuming the character of a one-party
state dominated by a political and ethnic elite with a
power base in southwest Uganda, despite the recent
transition to a multi-party system (Mugaju and Oloka-
Onyango 2000).
Soon after coming to power in January 1986, the
NRM was faced with a number of insurgencies on its
northern and western borders from armed groups
opposed to Museveni, which owed allegiance to
former regimes and capitalised on deep-set regional
grievances. The NRM sought to impose peace
through a combination of negotiated settlements
with armed groups, military force and political
cooptation. The government is credited with the
achievement of a durable cessation of conflict in
many parts of the country after years of political
instability and endemic violence rooted in religious
and ethnic rivalries (Kreimer et al. 2000). But while
the NRM managed to establish peace across much
of the central region, conflict continued in much of
the north and west, with no less than 14 separate
violent insurgencies breaking out after 1986 in
various parts of the country (Lomo and Hovil 2004).
Despite recent efforts to end the war in the north
through peace negotiations and intensified military
operations, the government has been markedly
unsuccessful in addressing the root causes of conflict
in the region which continues to be ravaged by war
and violence, resulting in development and poverty
outcomes that are much inferior to the rest of the
country (Robinson 2004a).
Following an initial period of resistance to
liberalisation and structural adjustment measures
after the NRM attained power, Uganda’s trajectory
of economic reforms can be divided into three
phases: contestation and reluctant adoption from
1987 to 1991, committed ownership from 1992 to
1998, and reform consolidation from 1999 to the
present. These are broadly consistent with a
sequence of reform respectively characterised by
stabilisation and recovery measures, structural
adjustment and liberalisation, and structural and
institutional reforms. The major features of the policy
reforms in each of these periods are briefly reviewed
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Figure 2 Overseas aid as a percentage of gross national income in Uganda, 1985–2002
SourceWorld Bank, World Development Indicators CD-Rom.
in the remainder of the article, with particular
attention to growth and poverty outcomes. The
design and management of economic and
institutional reforms in Uganda offer important
lessons for successful turnaround from a variety of
vantage points: political commitment, the timing and
sequencing of reforms, the strategy for
accommodating potential opposition and broadening
support for reform, and the role of aid donors in
providing ideas, advice and financial resources in
support of reform.
3 Economic decline and the path to recovery,
1986–91
The NRM government came to power in January
1986 with a clearly stated commitment to the Ten-
Point Programme that was developed during the
armed struggle against the Obote II and Okello
regimes. Its key premises included state-led
economic development, the elimination of
corruption, decentralisation of power, and
democracy (Twaddle 1988).
The new government inherited an economy in ruins.
The rate of inflation was very high, running at an
annual rate of 150 per cent, occasioned by economic
mismanagement and the scarcity of basic goods. The
official exchange rate was highly overvalued with
unofficial rates many times greater, curbing the level
of exports. Government finances were so weak that
foreign exchange reserves provided just two weeks
import cover. The banking system was unable to
provide loans for working capital and productive
investment on account of insolvency. Growth rates
went into reverse with real gross domestic product
(GDP) declining by 10 per cent between 1984 and
1985. By this time the economy had shrunk by more
than 20 per cent compared with a peak in 1970. Aid
flows had fallen to very low levels following a modest
recovery in the form of quick-disbursing International
Monetary Fund (IMF) credits to assist with economic
stabilisation in the early 1980s (Kasekende and Atingi-
Ego 1999; Hölmgren et al. 2001).
Faced with the severity of the economic crisis, the
government commissioned an in-depth study of the
economy by national and international experts to
make recommendations on policy options to
stimulate economic growth. There was considerable
resistance in the NRM political executive to IMF
policy prescriptions founded on stabilisation and
economic liberalisation that were associated with
the failed policies of the Obote II government.
Consequently, the government endorsed an
approach premised on increased government
intervention, retaining control over foreign exchange
rates, which were revalued upwards, and extension
of controls over the prices of essential imports
(Ochieng 1991; Harvey and Robinson 1995: 3–4). The
effects of these decisions were disastrous for
macroeconomic stability: inflation escalated to over
300 per cent by May 1987 and there was further
deterioration in most economic indicators.
The chronic economic situation provoked a far-
reaching reassessment of these policies and
persuaded the government to resume dialogue with
the IMF and the World Bank over advice and
financial support for an Economic Recovery
Programme (ERP). The ERP sought to promote
economic stabilisation and long-term growth by
mobilising investment in physical assets and
rehabilitating infrastructure. A series of policy
measures were implemented in pursuit of these
objectives led by currency reform and a sharp
devaluation of the exchange rate. These measures
were the first in a sequence of reforms that
cumulatively produced Uganda’s gradual turnaround.
The government deepened the acceptance and
ownership of the new policy package by virtue of
strong political leadership and the development of a
technocratic cadre charged with implementing the
economic reform agenda. The personal involvement
and authority of President Museveni was a decisive
factor in deepening political commitment and
bureaucratic compliance at a time of considerable
opposition to structural adjustment reforms from
within the NRM. Success in containing armed
rebellions in different parts of the country further
strengthened the President’s political authority and
provided assurance to potential detractors that a
sharp course correction would not undermine fragile
political settlement that had been achieved with the
installation of the Movement regime.
The change of policy direction was gradually
legitimised through careful deliberation of reform
options, key technocratic appointments and
institutional reform. The President created and
chaired the Presidential Economic Council as a
decision-making body that fostered debate on policy
options for structural adjustment reforms with the
assistance of independent experts, seminars and
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public discussion papers (Harvey and Robinson 1995;
Lamont 1995; Tumusiime-Mutebile 1995). An
experienced technocrat and reform advocate was
appointed as the Permanent Secretary in the
Ministry of Planning and Economic Development,
who in turn recruited an able set of young
economists to work on reform implementation. A
critical moment for the reform process came in the
form of a special government seminar for politicians,
officials and academics in December 1989 when the
arguments in favour of economic liberalisation
prevailed, with legalisation of the parallel market in
foreign exchange, a measure that exceeded the
conditionality imposed by the International Finance
Institutions (IFIs).
A second major turning point took place in late 1991
with the merger of the Ministries of Finance and
Planning into a single Ministry of Finance, Planning
and Economic Development (MOFPED). The merger
was occasioned by the failure to control public
expenditure on account of the monetisation of the
budget deficit, which in turn resulted in the
government reneging on IFI loan conditionalities,
and an upturn in inflation. The Minister of Finance
was sacked and the new ministry received a strong
political mandate for reform, marking the beginning
of a new phase in the reform process (Harvey and
Robinson 1995; Lamont 1995).
The results of this phase of the reform process were
very positive: lowering of the annual inflation rate
from 190 per cent to 28 per cent by the end of 1991;
revival of GDP growth rate from negative figures to
an average of 6.3 per cent per year over 1988–91;
and gradual recovery of exports and public and
private investment rates (Hölmgren et al. 2001: 121).
These outcomes were not dramatic in global terms
but marked the beginning of a process of turnaround
that was deepened and consolidated over the
ensuing decade.
Aid donors played a critical role in this early phase of
reform. Financial aid was critical for stimulating public
investment in infrastructure and balance of payments
support to restore financial stability. Over a five-year
period from 1987 to 1992, the World Bank provided
more than US$ 1billion in quick-disbursing policy-
based credits, supported by highly concessional
bilateral grant financing for adjustment operations.
Loan conditions ensured government adherence to
reform prescriptions and strengthened the hand of
reform-oriented technocrats. Technical assistance
from aid donors also played a role in sustaining the
reform process. The government commissioned
reports from independent experts paid by donors.
Government officials went on donor-funded study
tours to Ghana to learn from its successful
adjustment reforms. Foreign economists were placed
in placed in key ministries to serve as advisers and
train Ugandan counterparts (Hölmgren et al. 2001).
Political commitment and the support of aid donors
were the critical ingredients in this early phase of
reform. Political opposition was gradually sidelined as
pragmatic arguments in favour of economic reform
became ascendant in policy debate. The disastrous
experience of the first year of NRM in office with its
emphasis on price controls and government
intervention helped to persuade the President of the
need for reform. Advice from technocrats and aid
donors gradually convinced the President that
alternative approaches would not work. The
legitimacy acquired from the Movement’s success in
bringing an end to conflict in many parts of the
country strengthened the hand of the President,
giving him the confidence to depart from the
interventionist approach advocated in the Ten-Point
Programme. Government technocrats gradually
came to dominate the reform agenda and
bureaucratic resistance dissipated once the results of
the reforms became apparent. These developments
provided a solid foundation for donor assistance that
was critical to the successful implementation of
stabilisation and structural adjustment measures.
4 Government ownership and deepening
reform, 1992–8
The second phase of reform in Uganda was
characterised by deepening government ownership,
reflected in the decision to embark on a series of
ambitious and potentially contentious structural and
institutional reforms from the early 1990s. The
government also reformed its monetary and financial
policies by instituting a cash budget system to control
public expenditure, ensuring real interest rates on
government borrowing through Treasury bills,
further liberalising foreign exchange allocation and
exchange rates, and removing government controls
over interest rates to improve access to credit
(Hölmgren et al. 2001: 122).
Key structural reforms introduced in this period
included the creation of a semi-autonomous tax
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body (the Uganda Revenue Authority – URA), the
removal of the monopoly of the Coffee Marketing
Board and the abolition of the export tax on coffee.
The government also paved the way for far-reaching
reforms in the civil service following the
recommendations of a Public Service Review and
Reorganisation Commission established with
presidential backing in 1989. The civil service reform
programme that it gave rise to sought to rationalise
and restructure government ministries, downsize the
civil service establishment through payroll reform and
redundancies and move towards a minimum living
wage for civil servants.
1
The government proceeded with a programme of
military demobilisation from the late 1980s to reduce
pressure on the budget and to compensate potential
losers from the reform who could pose a threat to
political stability. The military defeat of armed
rebellions in the north of the country gave President
Museveni the confidence to proceed with this
potentially controversial measure, while aid donors
provided resources to compensate demobilised
soldiers and integrate them back into civilian life. The
government also embarked on an ambitious
decentralisation programme, institutionalising five
tiers of local councils in line with its stated
commitment in the Ten-Point Programme to
devolve substantial responsibilities and resources
from central government (Regan 1998).
The main outcomes of the policies adopted in the
period 1992–8 were reflected in a positive supply
side response and further progress on
macroeconomic stability. This found expression in a
sustained growth rate of real GDP of 7.6 per cent
per year (over 3 per cent per capita growth), an
increase in private sector investment from 9 to 13
per cent of GDP, a reduction in inflation to single
digit figures, an increase in foreign exchange cover
from two to five months of imports, and a fall in
the current account deficit from 6 to 4 per cent of
GDP from 1992 to 1996 (Hölmgren et al. 2001: 123).
The annual rate of consumer price inflation fell from
24.6 per cent in 1990/1 to -0.2 per cent in 1998/9
(World Bank 2000: 1). There was a positive supply
side response in the agriculture sector, with a
significant expansion of production and increase in
exports of coffee and cotton, attributable in
significant measure to liberalisation of agricultural
marketing and high world coffee prices (Dijkstra and
Van Donge 2001).
Tax revenues expanded from a low of 2 per cent in
1986 to 12 per cent by 1996, in large measure due to
simplification of tax assessment and improvements in
the efficiency of tax collection under the URA. There
was considerable progress in civil service reform with
rationalisation of the number and functions of
ministries, monetisation of housing and
transportation allowances, halving of the number of
civil servants through elimination of ‘ghost workers’
from the payroll, a generous voluntary severance
package, and redundancies for casual employees
(Harvey and Robinson 1995). There was slow and
steady progress on pay reforms with a series of
increases in but without achieving the declared
objective of a minimum living wage by 1996
(Robinson 2004b).
Stronger government ownership of the reform
programme was manifest in a number of areas. The
President displayed active commitment to various
reform initiatives, convening the Presidential
Economic Council on a regular basis, initiating the
civil service reform exercise through a special
presidential commission, and provided visible support
for the creation of the URA. Continuity in the
tenure of the Permanent Secretary in MOFPED
furthered political commitment to reform on
account of the close relationship maintained with
the President. His economic policy team attracted
highly motivated technocrats, many of whom had
received high-quality training overseas. Decisions to
embark on more challenging structural reforms were
often initiated in the absence of donor support or
conditionality but attracted financial assistance once
commitment was evident in the preparatory and
design work. There was little overt opposition to the
economic reform programme during this period,
largely because the debate on the merits of
liberalisation and structural adjustment had been
won by reform adherents by the beginning of the
1990s, with the benefits of reform becoming
increasingly apparent.
The government sought to build on this reform
momentum by engaging in dialogue with organised
business interests and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). The private sector was able to
lobby with some degree of success for changes in
budget and trade policy through the Uganda
Manufacturers Association and the Private Sector
Foundation. Economic policy was no longer treated
as the exclusive preserve of government as it was
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increasingly acknowledged in official circles that the
private sector had a legitimate voice in accordance
with its leading role in promoting growth and
employment creation. Increased opportunities for
consultation and dialogue deepened the credibility of
government policy commitments as it distanced
itself from the command economy approach that
was associated with the early years of the NRM
government. However, policy dialogue was restricted
for the most part to well-organised private sector
interests. The farming lobby, which stood to gain
from liberalisation in the agricultural sector, did not
exercise much leverage on the content of the
reforms. NGOs were vocal in their critique of the
distributional impact of the reforms, notably the
uncertain impact on poverty reduction and the
growing burden of debt, rather than tackling the
fundamentals of price and structural reforms. The
impact of their lobbying and advocacy work came to
fruition in the third phase of reform, when poverty
and public services were given a central place in
government policy objectives.
The government combined strategies of capacity
building in government with dialogue and
consultation with outside interests to deepen
commitment and broaden the legitimacy of the
reforms. It also devised measures to buy off potential
opponents of reform, notably those in the lower
ranks of the civil service who distrusted the
government’s emphasis on market-driven reforms
and acknowledged impatience with bureaucratic
inertia, and workers in public sector enterprises. The
civil service reform programme had the potential to
elicit potentially damaging opposition to a core
element in the government’s reform strategy. The
formation of a special presidential commission to
formulate a reform strategy followed by an extended
period of deliberation of policy options in the
political executive was indicative of the political
sensitivity of civil service reform.
In the event, there was little overt opposition from
civil servants for a number of reasons. First, those
hardest hit by the reforms through compulsory
redundancies were casual employees who were not
politically organised. Many had alternative sources of
income. Second, a substantial voluntary severance
package generously funded by aid donors placated
potential opponents to the reforms. Third, the
elimination of ghost workers (non-existent staff) only
affected corrupt officials who benefited from falsified
payroll records. Fourth, there was a positive incentive
for those who remained in the service in the form
short-term gains from salary enhancements that
offset the loss of non-monetary benefits through the
monetisation of allowances. Finally, the trade unions
were very weak and beset by factional struggles, and
were not in a position to rally opposition to the
reforms, despite legislation that gave legal recognition
to unions representing civil servants, medical staff and
teachers, and conferred rights to industrial action.
URA staff were recruited on very favourable terms
with salaries several multiples of what they had
received as civil servants working for the Ministry of
Finance, ensuring that monetary incentives offset the
loss of pension rights and contractual terms of
employment. None of these measures had adverse
economic consequences as the costs of reform were
largely borne by donors and increased salary costs
were covered by substantial payroll reductions and
increased tax revenues.
Opposition political parties were unable to mobilise
against the government on account of the ban on
organised party activity outside the Movement and
because they lacked the analytical skills and resources
to counter the government’s superior technocratic
capacity. The opposition was not well placed to
mobilise public opinion as it was closely implicated in
the disastrous economic policies of previous
governments and the NRM was credited with
achieving significant turnaround of the economy and
achieving some measure of political stability. The
most serious armed threats in the border regions
were contained through a combination of military
force and peace negotiations by the early 1990s.
The aid donors did not become directly engaged in
efforts to mobilise support for the reforms but often
provided the resources for consultations, workshops
and seminars in which economic policies were
presented and deliberated with a cross-section of
Ugandan civil society. Donors also provided direct
financial support for think tanks and business
associations that were firmly wedded to the
economic reform agenda, notably the Economic
Policy Research Centre, Uganda Manufacturers
Association, and the Private Sector Foundation. The
most significant financial outlay was for the generous
voluntary severance package provided to civil
servants through the civil service reform programme,
largely funded by aid donors, which did much to allay
opposition to structural reforms in the public service.
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Aid donors also provided financial support for
military demobilisation in the form of a package of
benefits for former soldiers to enable them to find
productive employment and peacefully reintegrate
into society. This had the advantage of helping the
government to reduce the fiscal burden of
supporting a large army and assuage a potential
source of discontent from soldiers disgruntled over
the demobilisation process, who could in turn pose a
direct political threat or join one of the insurgency
groups active on the country’s borders. Potential
opposition from the military was also offset through
the economic benefits that allegedly accrued to
senior officers in the Ugandan People’s Defence
Force (UPDF) from Uganda’s foray into the Congo
from 1996 and arms deals in connection with the
continued war in the north (Reno 2002; Tangri and
Mwenda 2003).
The 1990s were marked by a deepening process of
reform, characterised by a sequence of policy
initiatives beginning with fiscal and monetary
reforms and moving on to a series of structural
reforms designed to liberalise agricultural marketing,
reform the civil service and create an autonomous
taxation agency. Achievement of the government’s
macroeconomic targets and infusion of significantly
increased aid flows created a firm basis on which
more contentious structural reforms could be
pursued. Potential sources of opposition were
dissipated through redundancy packages for civil
servants and compensation for former combatants,
while the gains for farmers and business were
becoming increasingly evident. Throughout this
period, the achievement of political stability through
military victory and negotiated settlements with
rebel forces on the country’s borders provided a
greater sense of security and confidence in the
government’s policy intentions.
5 Reform consolidation: poverty reduction and
public services, 1999–2004
The challenge of poverty reduction did not feature
centrally as a reform objective in the first two phases
of reform when policy concern centred on growth
and macroeconomic stability with less attention to
poverty and equity issues. A special Programme to
Alleviate Poverty and the Social Costs of Adjustment
(PAPSCAD) received World Bank support in the late
1980s in recognition of the possibility that vulnerable
groups would not benefit directly and in the short
term from the economic recovery programme but
this had only a modest impact. However, there was
some evidence by the late 1990s of a decline in
poverty levels.
2
The 1997 household budget survey
pointed to increases in average household
expenditure in rural and urban areas of 128 and 133
per cent between 1992 and 1996. Over this period
the share of food and beverages in household
budgets showed a small decline, while the
percentage of iron-roofed houses increased from 38
per cent to 48 per cent (Hölmgren et al. 2001: 127).
From the late 1990s, policy-makers became
increasingly preoccupied with the problem of
poverty through improvements in public services and
investment in agriculture which provides the primary
source of livelihood for the majority of Ugandans.
This concern emanated in part from the criticism
levied by NGOs and academics who argued that
poverty levels were not significantly affected by the
economic reforms of the previous decade. Bilateral
donors increasingly drew attention to the
questionable impact of reforms on the poor.
Another focus of non-governmental advocacy
efforts was the growing level of debt that resulted
from the large-scale financing of the economic
reform programme by multilateral lenders. The
growing burden of debt diverted resources from
public expenditure on public services which were
coming under increasing pressure from the growing
HIV/AIDS crisis.
Several policy developments in the late 1990s
centrally addressed growing concerns over poverty
levels and the limited societal spread of the benefits
resulting from macroeconomic reform. These were
the poverty reduction strategy, debt reduction and
sustained investment in public services, especially
primary education.
In recognition of the need to make poverty
reduction a more central policy concern, the
government developed a comprehensive framework
in the form of a Poverty Eradication Action Plan
(PEAP) in 1997. The key elements in the PEAP were
a programme for agricultural modernisation,
universal primary education, primary healthcare,
improving the road network and the promotion of
the private sector. The objectives of the PEAP were
consistent with the economic recovery programme
with an emphasis on cultivating a supply-side
response from poor farmers, improving services and
promoting investment and economic growth as a
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means of providing employment. Government
resources for poverty reduction are earmarked in the
form of a Poverty Action Fund (PAF) that is ring-
fenced in the budget.
Aid donors played a key role in the PEAP
implementation by engaging closely with the
government in formulating PEAP priorities and
proving assistance in the form of direct budget
support. This new aid instrument rapidly became the
preferred mode of development assistance for
Uganda from the late 1990s with the result that the
principal aid donors – the World Bank and the UK
Department for International Development (DFID) –
now provide the bulk of their assistance in this form.
The aid donors favour budget support as it reduces
transaction costs and facilitates direct engagement
on government budget priorities through the PEAP
framework, while the Government of Uganda can
engage with donors in a more coordinated manner
with the predictability that direct budget support
confers. Bilateral donors continue to provide project
aid and technical assistance for targeted
interventions and agencies where budget support
may not be appropriate or where particular agencies
would not receive adequate level of support through
the normal budgetary process. The PEAP provides
increased opportunities for NGOs and the private
sector to engage in a more systematic consultative
process over policy priorities and budgetary
allocations. NGOs participate in a monitoring group
with government and donors to oversee the
implementation of the PAF.
A second element in the government’s strategy was
to reduce the growing burden of debt. Uganda’s
debt had steadily increased in the 1990s primarily on
account of soft loans from the international finance
institutions. Uganda became one of the first
beneficiaries of the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries) initiative which is a comprehensive
approach to debt reduction for the world’s poorest
and most heavily indebted countries proposed by
the World Bank and IMF and ratified by
governments around the world. Uganda managed
to reduce its burden of debt by US$ 2billion under
HIPC in 1998 and from the enhanced HIPC in 2000
and successfully rescheduled its remaining debt on
much more favourable terms (Dijkstra and Van
Donge 2001). The savings generated by HIPC are
directly invested in the PAF, principally for primary
education.
Increased investments in public services constitute
the third strand in the government’s anti-poverty
strategy by increasing the overall resource envelope
for health, education and drinking water and
improving the efficiency of resource utilisation. The
government launched the Universal Primary
Education (UPE) initiative in 1997 as a means of
increasing student enrolment using HIPC resources
and the PAF budget which was mainly funded by aid
donors. The UPE initiative resulted in a steady
increase in resources for the education sector, with
an increase in its budgetary share from 18.8 per cent
in 1995/6 to 22.7 per cent by 1998/9.
In an effort to improve the quality and efficacy of
government spending and predictability of
expenditure commitments, aid donors supported the
creation of a medium-term expenditure framework
under the aegis of MOFPED. They also urged the
government to tackle the problem of corruption in a
more direct and systematic fashion through a variety
of methods, ranging from expenditure tracking
surveys (which revealed considerable leakages in
primary education spending), improved procurement
systems in national and local government, payroll
reforms, and strengthening anti-corruption
institutions. All these initiatives signalled stronger
donor interest in the efficacy of government
spending and concerns about the diversion of public
resources from poverty reduction. Greater emphasis
on poverty reduction and prioritising public services
was allied with closer concern about increasing
levels of military spending which threatened to skew
budget priorities and increase the current account
deficit at the expense of health and education.
An important consequence of these measures and
Uganda’s continued success in maintaining
macroeconomic stability and growth has been a
sustained reduction in poverty incidence from 56 per
cent in 1992 to 35 per cent in 2000. There was a
significant decline in poverty incidence among cash
crop producers but the corresponding level for
subsistence farmers remained stubbornly high. An
increase in the population living in poverty to 38 per
cent in 2002 is attributed to poor weather rather
than adversely affected agricultural production and
overall economic growth rates (World Bank 2004).
The period since 1999 can be typified as one of
reform consolidation, in which the Ugandan
government increasingly directed its attention to the
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challenge of poverty reduction and improvements in
public service provision. The PEAP provides a
framework through which the government can
mobilise a large volume of budget resources from
foreign aid donors in support of its central policy
objectives. Successful leveraging of resources from
HIPC debt initiative enabled the government to fund
sustained investment in essential services without a
significant mobilisation of domestic resources. The
continued inflow of donor finance for poverty-
related investments permits a significant diversion of
resources into defence and public administration in
pursuit of a political agenda that is increasingly
dominated by maintaining the Movement system
through patronage and measures to ensure the
support of the military. The problem of corruption
has deepened as highly placed army commanders
and public officials benefit from state largesse and
rent-seeking opportunities conferred by ethnic and
family ties (Watt et al. 1999; Tangri and Mwenda
2003). Maintaining a balance between the pursuit of
a benign reform agenda that continues to deepen
Uganda’s turnaround and the prerogatives of
managing the political foundations of the Movement
regime which has the potential to undermine its
considerable achievements to date, is the central
challenge facing the Museveni government in the
transition to a multi-party system.
6 Conclusions
The principal lessons from Uganda’s successful
experience of turnaround are a decisive break with
failed strategies, internal deliberation as a basis for
growing ownership on the part of government,
vesting authority in technocrats charged with
responsibility for reform design and implementation,
and the timing and sequencing of policy reforms. The
government was not single-minded in its pursuit of
an economic reform agenda from the outset but
rather demonstrated its willingness to learn from
other countries that had successfully embarked on a
reform trajectory. The government has also been
willing to test out and defend its ideas in the face of
criticism from internal detractors (especially in the
late 1980s when a sharp change of course became
necessary) and private sector and NGO lobbies. It has
proven adept at consultation with organised
interests and in actively promoting its policies in the
public domain through the media and think tanks.
Political leadership is a significant factor in explaining
Uganda’s sustained turnaround. President Museveni
has been at the helm of the Movement for two
decades and can claim personal credit for many of
the country’s achievements during this period.
Political commitment was necessary for sustaining
the momentum of the economic reform process,
with demonstrated capacity to develop and defend
new policy positions and reform strategies in the
face of internal opposition. Considerable investment
in public services and anti-poverty programmes in
recent years is illustrative both of the President’s
personal conviction and recognition of the political
benefits that can accrue from success in improving
public welfare. Personal conviction on the necessity
of economic reform has deepened over time as a
result of the influence of the private sector and aid
donors. The President claims consistency in this
regard with the essence of the Ten-Point
Programme, arguing that economic growth driven
by private sector development is the surest route to
poverty reduction and national prosperity.
President Museveni continued to derive considerable
legitimacy from bringing peace to much of the
country and defeating armed insurgencies, as reflected
in a strong popular mandate from successive electoral
contests. Popular legitimacy and military support form
the bedrock for the regime, enabling the President to
pursue difficult and potentially unpopular reforms. The
NRM came to power through armed struggle and the
President retains the loyalty of senior army officers
through high defence expenditures, the acquisition of
military hardware, and business opportunities resulting
from engagement in the civil war in the Congo.
However, patronage politics based on personal and
family ties has the potential to undermine the long-
term sustainability of the reforms if it remains
unchecked, since favouritism towards the President’s
own ethnic group from southwest Uganda
undermines the Movement’s claim to be a broad-
based organisation that is opposed to the divisive
ethnic politics of the past.
The timing and sequencing of reforms had a
significant bearing on Uganda’s successful reform
trajectory. In the late 1980s, the government had
little option but to opt for a package of ‘zero-
generation’ stabilisation and devaluation measures
through the Economic Recovery Programme to
ward off deepening economic crisis. This was
combined with essential investments in the
rehabilitation of infrastructure. Price and structural
reforms followed with legalisation of the parallel
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foreign exchange market and the abolition of the
state monopoly in coffee marketing. A series of key
institutional reforms were subsequently introduced
in the 1990s to improve revenue collection and the
efficiency of the civil service, and in the form of
financial expenditure management to improve the
transparency and efficiency of the budget process
and the tracking of expenditure commitments.
Development assistance has been critical to Uganda’s
turnaround. The government has received consistent
support from aid donors, beginning with support for
ideas and advice in the early stages of reform
followed by a substantial and growing commitment
of financial resources. Donors have employed a
variety of aid instruments in their support for the
government’s reform programme, using technical
assistance to provide advice as required by the
government and capacity-building support to build
up a cadre of experienced and committed
technocrats. Budget support has been instrumental
in providing a predictable flow of financial resources
in support of government budgetary commitments
within the framework of the PEAP. Conditionality
has been employed sparingly, usually as part of
World Bank and IMF structural adjustment credits,
and often with the active support of reformers who
could use conditionality to convince detractors of the
need for reform in the late 1980s, and to maintain
political commitment to ensure continued progress
(Hölmgren et al. 2001: 141). The aggregate impact of
aid on economic growth and poverty reduction has
been significant. According to estimates furnished by
Reinikka and Collier (2001: 43), aid contributed 31 per
cent of the 5.5 per cent average growth rate and 29
per cent of the decline in poverty levels in the period
1992–7.
A further ingredient in the government’s approach
was a conscious strategy of compensating the losers
of reform, especially those who posed a potential
source of opposition to the reforms such as
government servants retrenched in the civil service
reform programme and demobilised soldiers. Active
compensation through voluntary severance packages
and demobilisation allowances served to moderate
potential opposition to reform. While it could be
argued that compensating the potential opponents
to reform was not critical to successful
implementation as their political influence was
relatively marginal, the government took
considerable care in formulating its proposals and
fostering internal support for these prior to
implementation. The financial cost to the
government was modest on account of donor
support for these measures.
In contrast, the government has been less successful
in mobilising the potential beneficiaries of reform or
in compensating those who have not benefited from
the reforms, principally subsistence farmers and the
consumers of public health and education services
who form the majority of the poor in Uganda.
Farmers are not adept at mobilising over reforms
and have had only limited engagement in policies
which seek to produce a favourable supply-side
response, in the form of liberalisation of coffee
marketing and the programme for the
modernisation of agriculture. However, the failure to
mobilise farming interests may not be significant in
political terms as ‘The liberalization and
reorganization of agricultural marketing are now
beyond political debate as they brought widespread
benefits’ (Dijkstra and Van Donge 2001: 858). Users
of government health and education services are not
experienced in lobbying government for improved
services or in pursuing complaints, partly on account
of democratic deficiencies in the Movement system
of government and weaknesses in the accountability
of elected representatives to their constituencies and
the lack of consistency and efficacy of NGO
advocacy efforts but also because of the difficulty of
making demands on the political system.
The real losers of the reform process in economic
terms are not so much demobilised soldiers and low-
grade civil servants who posed a potential source of
political opposition but people living in parts of the
country where the government has failed to achieve
a durable cessation of conflict. Large parts of
northern Uganda remain unstable and people in the
region are subject to periodic and brutal acts of
violence. The conflict absorbs large amounts of
government resources in the form of military
expenditures but has also excluded large numbers of
people from the fruits of development enjoyed
elsewhere in the country. The persistence of violent
conflict in the north has increased defence spending
as the government seeks to tackle the long-standing
insurgency in the region through the superior
deployment of military force which threatens to
upset fiscal discipline. The failure to achieve durable
peace through a political settlement in northern
Uganda retards economic progress, human
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development and poverty reduction, and places
limitations on the sustainability of the country’s
turnaround.
Despite Uganda’s evident success in promoting
economic growth and reducing poverty, significant
challenges remain. Reductions in poverty levels have
levelled off since 2002, ostensibly on account of
adverse weather conditions and a reduced rate of
economic growth. Remote rural districts have not
benefited to the same extent from the growth that
has brought an improvement in living standards in the
country’s heartland, while two-thirds of subsistence
farmers remain in poverty. Several key social indicators
remain below the average for sub-Saharan Africa,
while social indicators and poverty levels in much of
northern Uganda are much worse than in the central
region. Despite success in debt reduction through the
HIPC initiative, Uganda remains highly dependent on
aid flows to sustain the government budget (currently
52 per cent of the total).
The sustainability of the reform process is also
vulnerable to political developments that relate to
the character of the Movement regime and efforts
to maintain its support base in the face of the
transition to a multi-party system. Evidence points to
a slowing of public sector management reforms,
with the momentum of civil service reform visibly
flagging in the face of increased budgetary outlays
for the public administration sector and growing
problems of corruption in revenue administration
and service delivery (Robinson 2004b). The failure to
achieve a durable political settlement in the north
and to address pressing governance issues such as
corruption and the high defence budget may lead to
a reconsideration of priorities on the part of aid
donors and growing resort to conditionality or
reduced levels of assistance, which in turn could
threaten Uganda’s considerable achievements to
date.
Notes
1. For a detailed account of the Uganda Revenue
Authority and the Civil Service Reform Programme, see
Robinson (2004b).
2. The World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy reported
a 20 per cent decline in the headcount index of poverty
from 1992 to 1997, though more recent household
survey figures point to a slower rate of decline (World
Bank 2000: 1).
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